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Abstract
At the highest level of formal certiﬁcation, the current research trend consists in providing evaluators with
a formal checkable proof produced by automatic veriﬁcation tools. The aim is to reduce the certiﬁcation
process to verifying the provided proof using a proof-checker. However, to date, no certiﬁed proof-checker
has emerged. In addition, checkable proofs do not eliminate the need to validate the formalization of the
veriﬁcation problem. In this paper we consider the point of view of evaluators. We elaborate criteria
that must be fulﬁlled by a formal proof in order to convince skeptical evaluators. Then, we present a
methodology based on this notion of convincing proofs that requires simple formalizations to reach the level
of conﬁdence of formal certiﬁcation. The key idea is to build a certiﬁed proof-checker – in collaboration
with the evaluators – which is ﬁnally used to validate the proof provided by developers. We illustrate our
approach on the correctness proof of a buﬀering protocol written in c that manages the data exchanges
between concurrent tasks in avionics control systems.
Keywords: certiﬁcation, formal proofs, certiﬁed proof-checker, reduction of the trusted computing base.
At the highest level of certiﬁcation many norms in avionics (DO-178B, IEC61508)
or security (Common Criteria) highly recommend the use of formal methods [10,16].
Additionally, in some ﬁelds, computer aided veriﬁcation is mature enough to re-
wards the developers with a rich feedback and an increase in conﬁdence. Formal
methods would then become worthwhile if the verdict of the veriﬁcation tools could
be reused in the certiﬁcation process. However, this is not the case since evalua-
tors cannot assume that the implementation of a veriﬁcation tool is correct. Even
approaches in which veriﬁcation tools are instrumented to produce formal proofs of
their verdict [2,11,13,14,15,17] can be rejected. Indeed, even though it is commonly
thought that a formal proof is the highest reachable level of conﬁdence one can ex-
pect, evaluators put strong conditions before accepting a formal proof as certiﬁcate.
For instance, an overlooked issue that arises in formal veriﬁcation of processors is
the model validation, which is crucial to ensure that formal analysis applies to the
actual machine (M.Wildings [21]).
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We illustrate our understanding of the evaluators’ requirements3 for the use of
formal proofs in certiﬁcation on a realistic case study: the proof of correctness of a
buﬀering protocol written in c that manages the data exchanges between concurrent
tasks in avionics control systems [19]. In order to convince evaluators that a program
P carries out a property Φ, by the means of a proof: (i) the proof must be checkable
by a machine using a proof-checker that the evaluators have already certiﬁed; (ii)
the program P addressed in the proof must be the actual program to certiﬁed,
not a simpliﬁed or abstract representation of P ; (iii) the property Φ addressed in
the proof must be in a setting on which the evaluators agreed; (iv) the semantics
of the language in which P is written and the semantics of the logic that is used
to state the property Φ must be explicit to sustain the validation process; (v) all
of these deﬁnitions must be obvious and, if possible, be kept close to the standard
background of computer scientists in mathematics; (vi) ﬁnally, it should be obvious
that the proof exactly addresses the veriﬁcation problem and not another similar
problem. We introduce the terminology “convincing proofs” to denote checkable
proofs that fulﬁll these six requirements. As a starting point we review related
work on checkable proofs with respect to these criteria.
Related work In theory, the veriﬁcation methods that return a witness
could be enhanced to produce convincing proofs [17]. Let us stress the points that
require some extra work to meet the criteria of convincing proofs. All algorithmic
methods that determine if a program fulﬁlls a property apply many transformations
to the initial veriﬁcation problem. Among them, the most common are abstraction
(e.g., from c to boolean programs [11]), reduction to so-called small models [2], and
reformulation in another framework (e.g., from μ-calculus to games theory [13], from
imperative to functional programs [7]). Several tools use external theorem provers
and decision procedures that must then be certiﬁed or instrumented [4,14]. Criteria
(ii) and (iii) require that all of these transformations and external computations
appear with justiﬁcation in the ﬁnal proof. Most veriﬁcation tools do not fulﬁll
criterion (iv) since the semantics of their framework (the programming language
and its associated logic) are hard-coded into the tools and not easily available for
validation.
Closer to our work is the use of deductive methods based on the calculus of
weakest preconditions. The tools caduceus/why [8] and caveat [16] are used
in veriﬁcation of critical applications written in c. They oﬀer a good tradeoﬀ
between automation and conﬁndence. However they do not produce a proof of
correctness of the original program that could be checked by an independent cer-
tiﬁed prover: caveat uses internal decision procedures and simpliﬁcation rules
and caduceus/why transforms the original program before generating veriﬁca-
tion conditions which entails the correctness. The generation of checkable proofs is
addressed in the Proof-Carrying Code architecture (pcc [14]) and its foundational
extension (fpcc [22]): the formal proof of an untrusted program is checked before
3 The following list of evaluator requirements was elaborated in the industrial project eden that aims at
certifying security applications at the highest level of the Common Criteria (see http://www.eden-rntl.org)
and through participation to several working groups with the French certiﬁcation authority for security
(dcssi), and with the formal methods teams of eads and ratp (the French metro company).
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its execution, thus preventing users from the possible damage due to downloaded
applications. These frameworks do not fulﬁll all of the evaluators’ requirements:
pcc still depends on a generator of veriﬁcation conditions (vcg) to connect the
proof, the program and the property. Moreover the deﬁnition of the program and
property semantics is part of 23 000 lines of c that implement the vcg. That se-
mantics is explicit in fpcc but it must be given in the minimal logic used in the
proof (based on lambda calculus). Experience has shown that this results in numer-
ous deﬁnitions and very complex semantics models [9]. Finally, it is worth noticing
that, to date, no proof-checker has been certiﬁed. Hence, criterion (i) remains un-
satisﬁed, despite an attempt to minimize and prove the coq proof-checker in the
coq proof assistant [3].
Approach In this paper, we focus on the evaluator requirements. We present
a framework for certiﬁcation that is illustrated on a buﬀering protocol written in
c that manages the data exchanges between concurrent tasks in avionics control
systems. The resulting proof of correctness fulﬁlls the criteria of convincing proofs.
More precisely, our framework conforms to the following guideline: (i) the certiﬁ-
cation process leads to a trusted proof-checker which is built in collaboration with
the evaluators; (ii) the proof is done on the abstract syntax tree of the program.
The original program can be ﬁltered out from the proof-term using a simple and
easy to validate pretty printer (not presented in this paper); (iii) evaluators and
developers must agree on a logical framework in which the correctness property
can be stated; (iv) they must validate all the logical and semantic rules of the
proof-system; (v) these derivation rules must then be carefully chosen: they must
be obvious and as few in number as possible to ease the validation process. In
this paper, we use extended transition systems, symbolic history of variables and
symbolic equalities. The program is given an operational semantics as derivation
rules which deﬁne the eﬀect of an instruction in terms of basic predicates of the
logic. Contrarily to general purpose veriﬁcation tools, only the instructions used
in the program to be certiﬁed must be addressed. (vi) the program and the prop-
erty appear explicitly in the correctness statement. The proof-term consists in the
derivation tree of that statement which then appears at the root.
Our work has been inspired by studies on fpcc [1,9] but it diﬀers on two impor-
tant points that were dictated by criteria (i) and (vi) of convincing proofs: 1) we
avoid the deﬁnition of an operational semantics for all constructions and operators
of c; 2) optimized proof-checkers for compact proofs are very complex and will be
diﬃcult to certify. For this reason, this paper focuses on transparency of the proof-
checker. The compactness of proofs is left for future work. As far as we know it is
the ﬁrst attempt to produce a checkable proof in foundational logic of a non trivial
program (a protocol for event driven system) reasoning directly on non-transformed
c code and reducing the tcb close to minimum: a compiler and a machine.
Outline of the paper The rest of the paper is devoted to the design of a
framework for convincing proofs. It is based on foundational proofs and depends
on the construction of a certiﬁed proof-checker in collaboration with evaluators.
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Since the certiﬁcation process requires that evaluators validate the semantics rules,
we show in Section 1 how to take advantage of this validation phase to produce a
certiﬁed proof-checker by a straightforward translation of the semantics rules. In
Section 2, we brieﬂy present the protocol and the correctness statements that will
serve as a basis to illustrate our framework. The formalization of the veriﬁcation
problem is explained in Section 3. The derivation rules that capture the semantics of
c programs, of concurrent tasks, of priority and preemption are given in Section 4.
Their translation into prolog is straightforward and deﬁnes the recursive proof-
checker function. Improvements and future work are discussed in Section 5.
1 Construction of a certiﬁed proof-checker
Our reduction of the trusted computing base (tcb) is a consequence of the fact
that our methodology produces a certiﬁed proof-checker that is ﬁnally used to val-
idate the proof. The idea is the following: we explain each derivation rule of the
proof system to the evaluators who must accept and validate each rule – to succeed,
the rules must be simple and obvious. The proof-checker is then a straightforward
translation of these rules into a programming language – to be trusted, the trans-
lation must be simple and obvious. The proof-checker can then be removed from
the tcb which is then reduced to a compiler and a machine. Finally, the proof of
correctness is validated using the certiﬁed proof-checker which checks that it is a
combination of valid derivation steps.
1.1 Foundational ﬁrst-order logic on uninterpreted predicates
We consider the ﬁrst-order logic over uninterpreted predicates represented by syn-
tactical terms. The formulæ are built using the standard connectors (∧,∨,⇒,¬)
and the quantiﬁers (∀,∃). In our framework, all predicates and connectives are un-
interpreted in the sense that they are not associated to models (the mathematical
structures on which the predicates can be interpreted to determine their validity).
The intended meaning of each term of the logic is captured in the set of derivation
rules that deﬁne the proof system. We recall that a proof system does not give
a semantic meaning to a formula ; it only deﬁnes the provability of statements as
derivability in the following sense: a statement is provable if and only if it can be
obtained by the application of the derivation rules [20]. The distinction between va-
lidity with respect to a model and provability is not signiﬁcant to evaluators: they
must either validate the model of a logic or its proof system. Our claim is that it is
easier to validate derivation rules.
The logical proofs are drawn up in the proof-system of the natural deduction for
ﬁrst-order logic. It is known to be sound and complete [20]. Thanks to its strong
connection with logical deduction steps used in mathematical proofs, it is easy to
obtain its validation by evaluators. The derivation rules are given in Figure 1 in
addition to the principle of induction on natural numbers and Leibniz’s elimina-
tion of equality. We adopt a presentation of statements as sequents of the form
H  Φ which means that Φ can be derived under the hypothesis H. Compared
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H  Φ2
H  Φ1 ∨ Φ2
∨intro1
H  Φ1
H  Φ1 ∨ Φ2
∨intro2
H,Φ1  Ψ H,Φ2  Ψ
H,Φ1 ∨ Φ2  Ψ
∨elim
H  Φ1 H  Φ2
H  Φ1 ∧ Φ2
∧intro
H  Φ1 ∧ Φ2
H  Φ2
∧elim1
H  Φ1 ∧ Φ2
H  Φ1
∧elim2
(Φ∈H)
H  Φ hyp
H,Φ  Ψ
H  Φ ⇒ Ψ
⇒intro H  Φ H  Φ ⇒ ΨH  Ψ
⇒elim
H,Φ  ⊥
H  ¬Φ ¬intro
H  ¬¬Φ
H  Φ
¬elim H  Φ[x ← x˜]H  ∀x, Φ ∀intro
H  ∀x, Φ
H  Φ[x ← t] ∀elim (t)
H  Φ ∧ ¬Φ
H  ⊥ ⊥
H  Φ[x ← t]
H  ∃x, Φ ∃intro (x˜/∈Var(Ψ))
H  ∃x, Φ H,Φ[x ← x˜]  Ψ
H  Ψ ∃elim
H  Φ H  e = e′
H  Φ[e ← e′]
=elim
x = y
y = x
=sym x = x
=reﬂ
e = simpl(e)
simpl
H  Φ(0) H  ∀k:nat, Φ(k) ⇒ Φ(k + 1)
H  ∀n:nat, Φ(n) ind Q∈{∀,∃}
H  Qx:typ, Φ
H  Qx, typ(x) ⇒ Φ type(↑↓)
Φ,Ψ denotes formulæ, x˜ is a fresh symbol, t denotes a term that can be chosen, Var(Φ) is the set of free
variables of Φ and Φ[x ← y] denotes the formula Φ where all free instances of x are replaced by y. Rule
(=elim) is also known as Leibniz’s replacement of an expression e by an equivalent one e
′. The transitivity
of equality is a consequence of (=elim). The rule (simpl) uses the simpliﬁcation function of Section 3.2.
Rule (ind ) is the induction principle on natural numbers. Rule (type) translates type constraints as a
predicate. The other rules are the standard ones of the natural deduction.
Fig. 1. Rules of the natural deduction and induction for ﬁrst-order logic in a sequent presentation
to other proof systems, sequents simplify the management of hypotheses and this
reveals useful to obtain a simple proof-checker by a straightforward translation of
the derivation rules in Section 1.3.
1.2 The representation of proof-terms
A proof of a statement H  Φ is a ﬁnite derivation tree whose conclusion – the
root of the tree 4 – is the statement to prove, and which is only formed of valid
applications of the derivation rules of the proof system, meaning that each particular
application of a rule is obtained by instantiating its variables while respecting the
side condition (if there is one). In our framework, derivation trees are represented
as terms (denoted by ∇,∇1,...) which conform to the following BNF syntax where
Φ is a formula and H is a list of formulæ.
∇ ::= apply(rule name, [∇1, . . . ,∇n], H  Φ)
Since a proof is a ﬁnite tree, its leaves can only be applications of derivation rules
with no premises, e.g., apply(hyp, [ ],H  Φ), the invocation of the (hyp) rule of
Figure 1 that can exploit a hypothesis Φ if the side-condition Φ ∈ H holds.
4 In the literature on proof systems a proof-term is usually represented as a tree with hypotheses on leaves
and the statement to prove at its root.
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1.3 Construction of the proof-checker
Consider the derivation rule (∧intro) of Figure 1. A derivation tree ∇ =
apply(∧intro, [∇1,∇2],H  Φ1 ∧ Φ2) is a proof of the statement H  Φ1 ∧ Φ2 if
the three following conditions are satisﬁed: the last step of ∇ is a valid instanti-
ation of (∧intro), ∇1 is a proof of H  Φ1 and ∇2 is a proof of H  Φ2. These
conditions can easily be written as a prolog clause where the statement H  Φ
and the formula Φ1∧Φ2 are denoted by the terms sequent(H,Φ) and and(Φ1,Φ2).
We remind the reader that, in prolog, terms are not interpreted, meaning that
they are not functions but syntactic representations which can be inspected using
pattern-matching.
The (∧intro) derivation rule:
H  Φ1 H  Φ2
H  Φ1 ∧ Φ2
∧intro
and the corresponding prolog clause:
check(∇,Seqt):- Seqt = sequent(H, and(Φ1,Φ2)),
∇ = apply(and intro, [∇1,∇2], Seqt),
check(∇1, sequent(H,Φ1)),
check(∇2, sequent(H,Φ2)).
The predicate check(∇,Seqt) holds if ∇ is a valid proof of the statement Seqt
where Seqt = H  Φ1 ∧ Φ2. The proof-checking consists in verifying that: ∇
is an application of the rule (∧intro) to two sub-proofs ∇1 and ∇2 with Seqt as
conclusion, and the sub-proofs (∇1, resp. ∇2) are valid proofs of the premises
(H  Φ1, resp. H  Φ2) of the rule (∧intro). This explains the recursive calls to
check(∇1, sequent(H,Φ1)) and check(∇2, sequent(H,Φ2)).
The proof-checker is obtained in a similar way by applying the straightforward
translation of Figure 2 to each derivation rule. The result is a set of prolog clauses
that deﬁne a recursive predicate check(∇,H  Φ) which holds if and only if ∇ is a
valid derivation of the statementH  Φ with respect to the rules of the proof system.
This predicate uses only a subset of prolog for derivation rules (recursion, a limited
form of uniﬁcation and no backtracking). This choice is defended in [22]. Actually,
any programming language with recursion and pattern-matching can be used but
the formulation in prolog had our preference since it is close to mathematical
deﬁnitions.
∇ = apply
0BBBBB@
[∇1 . . . ∇n]
rule (condition)
H1  Φ1 . . . Hn  Φn
H  Φ
H  Φ
1CCCCCA
check(∇,Seqt):- Seqt= sequent(H, Φ),
∇ = apply(rule, [∇1, . . . ,∇n], Seqt),
condition,
check(∇1, sequent(H1,Φ1)),
. . ., check(∇n, sequent(Hn,Φn)).
Fig. 2. Translation of derivation rules into prolog clauses that deﬁne the proof-checker recursive function
The rest of the paper describes our use of this framework to produce a convincing
proof of correctness for a complex communication protocol written in c. First, the
logical proof-system is enriched with derivation rules that deﬁne the semantics of
the protocol. Second, the validation of these rules by the evaluators and their
translation in prolog furnish a certiﬁed proof-checker. Finally, evaluators deliver
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the certiﬁcate if and only if the proof-term provided by the developpers is accepted
by the proof-checker.
2 Case study: correctness of a communication protocol
In this section we brieﬂy present the protocol that will serve to illustrate our notion
of convincing proofs. The protocol is used to implement multi-tasking real-time
data-ﬂow applications on an event-based operating system featuring priority and
pre-emption [19]. It has been designed for an avionics control system that consists
in a pool of tasks running on a single processor. Each task has an id i and is triggered
by the environment on arrival of an event i. It then reads available inputs from
other tasks, does some computation and outputs its results to all others tasks.
The development of the control system is conducted under the assumption that
computations take no time, that is, the output of a task is available instantaneously
after its triggering. This so-called synchronous or 0-delay assumption drastically
simpliﬁes the development since engineers need only focus on the data-ﬂow be-
tween tasks [5]. Therefore, the actual implementation must ensure that a task r (a
reader) which uses the output of a task w (a writer) gets the correct output with
respect to the data-ﬂow ordering independently of the computation time of each
task (see Section 2.2 and [19] for details).
2.1 The protocol
The protocol of Figure 3 garantees this property despite any number of temporary
suspension (preemption) of any task by other tasks of higher priority and whatever
the priorities of the tasks. It consists in two c procedures that manage a series
of two-place buﬀers. A pair of buﬀers (Bh2l[w][r],Bl2h[w][r]) is required for
each pair of read and write tasks (say Task w, Task r). Actually, only one of these
buﬀers is signiﬁcant depending on the priority order of the reader and the writer.
For instance, data exchanges between a high-priority writer w and a low-priority
reader r are done by the means of the buﬀer Bh2l[w][r].
An execution of a Task i consists in a sequence of two calls: a call to os(i)
that updates the reading (inst. I1) and writing (inst. I2) locations of a Task i, followed
by a call to task(i) that collects the inputs from the buﬀers (inst. I3), calls the
computation function of Task i (inst. I4) and writes the results back in the buﬀers
(inst. I5). Since the rest of the paper does not require a deeper understanding of the
behavior of the protocol, we refer the interested reader to [19] for a more detailed
description. We now turn to the formalization of the correctness problem.
2.2 The correctness property
In order to state the correctness property, following [19], we deﬁne three events that
govern the run of a Task: i denotes a triggering of Task i that begins with the
execution of os(i). Triggering events come from the environment through sensors.
The others events i and i are produced by the operating system. i indicates
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int prio[T]; // prio is a static array that associates a priority level to a task id
bool lwl[T][T]; // lwl[w][r] = location where a low writer w must write for a high reader r
bool lwh[T][T]; // lwh[w][r] = location where a high writer w must write for a low reader r
bool lrl[T][T]; // lrl[r][w] = location where a low reader r must read from a high writer w
bool lrh[T][T]; // lrh[r][w] = location where a high reader r must read from a low writer w
data Bl2h[T][T][2]; // Bl2h[w][r] = two-place buffer for low (w) to high (r) data flow
data Bh2l[T][T][2]; // Bh2l[w][r] = two-place buffer for high (r) to low (w) data flow
data inp[T][T]; // inp[r][w] = input of task r from task w
data out[T]; // out[i] = output of task i
void os(taskid i){
taskid w,r ;
I1: updates
reading
locations
of Task i
26664
for(w = 0; w < T; w++){
lrh[i][w] = !lwl[w][i];
lrl[i][w] = lwh[w][i];
}
I2: updates
writing
locations
of Task i
2666664
for(r = 0; r < T; r++){
lwl[i][r] = !lwl[i][r];
if (lrl[r][i] == lwh[i][r])
lwh[i][r] = !lwh[i][r];
}
}
void task(taskid i){
taskid w,r ;
I3: reads
inputs
of Task i
2666666664
for(w = 0; w < T; w++){
if(prio[i] > prio[w])
inp[i][w] = Bl2h[w][i][ lrh[i][w] ];
else
inp[i][w] = Bh2l[w][i][ lrl[i][w] ];
}
I4:
h
out[i] = computation(i,inp[i]);
I5: writes
outputs
of Task i
26664
for(r = 0; r < T; r++){
Bl2h[i][r][ lwl[i][r] ] = out[i];
Bh2l[i][r][ lwh[i][r] ] = out[i];
} }
Fig. 3. The global variables and c procedures of the protocol for a given number T of tasks
reading
inputs
writing
outputs time
priority level
computing
os(i)
i
i
i
task(i)
Fig. 4. Representation of the run of a Task with id i: it executes os(i) then task(i)
the starting point of task(i) which ends by sending the i event (see Figure 4).
Each event is annotated by its occurence number such that the sequence of events
k
i ..
k
i ..
k
i refers to the k
th run of Task i. The correctness of the protocol for high-
to-low data-ﬂows can now be stated precisely:
Consider a task w (the writer) and a task r (the reader) such that prio[w] ≥
prio[r]. For each possible sequence of events σ such that the kth triggering of
Task w (event kw) is the latest run of w before the p
th triggering of Task r (event
p
r) the pth input of task r from w must be the kth output of task w.
The formal statement of the high-to-low correctness property is given in Figure 6.
The correctness property for low-to-high data-ﬂows is a bit more subtle but very
similar. The meaningful part of Figure 6 is kw ..
p
r ..
k+1
w ⊆ σ ⇒ (inp[r][w])p =
(out[w])k where (x)k is the kth value of x, and e..e′ denotes a loose sequence where
the dots represent an unspeciﬁed sequence of events, and σ′ ⊆ σ means that the
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priority level
time
(out[w])k
Bh2l[w][r]
0 1
(out[w])k+1
k+2
w p+1
r
p
r
k
w
p
r
k
w k
w
p
r
p+1
r p+1
r
k+1
w k+1
w
(inp[r][w])p+1 = (out[w])k+2
k+2
w
(out[w])k (inp[r][w])
p
k+1
w
k+2
w
Fig. 5. Illustration of the protocol behavior for high-to-low data-ﬂows
∀T :nat, ∀k:nat, ∀p:nat, ∀r:nat, ∀w:nat, ∀σ:seq, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the variables are typed
w ≤ T ∧ r ≤ T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T is the size of the pool of tasks
∧ decl(os(int i){...T ...}) ∧ decl(task(int i){...T ...}) . . . . . . . .declarations of the protocol procedures
∧ pcse(os(i), i) ∧ pcse(task(i), i ; i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . associates procedure calls and seq. of events
∧ wf(σ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .σ is a well-formed sequence of events
∧ prio[w] ≥ prio[r] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . we consider the case of a high-to-low data-ﬂow
∧ pr ⊆ σ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the pth execution of task r completed its execution
∧ kw .. pr .. k+1w ⊆ σ . . . . . . . . . . . . kw is the latest triggering of Task w before the pth triggering of Task r
⇒ (inp[r][w])p = (out[w])k . . . . . . . . . . . . the data-ﬂow respects the triggering order of the Tasks r and w
Fig. 6. The formal correctness property for high-to-low data-ﬂow
sub-sequence σ′ can be extracted from σ, that is, all events of σ′ appear in σ and
their ordering in σ′ is preserved in σ. The loose sequence kw ..
p
r ..
k+1
w captures the
scenario addressed in the correctness property, then the required data-ﬂow can easily
be speciﬁed as an equality using history of variables. The predicate pcse associates
a procedure call to a sequence of events: pcse(os(i), i) captures the fact that
os(i) is atomic (its starting and ending events are collapsed into a single event i).
On the contrary, pcse(task(i), i ; i) points out that task(i) is preemptable.
Finally, notice that the implementation of Figure 3 is parameterized by the
number T of tasks to manage. This parameter is universally quantiﬁed in the
correctness property meaning that the proof covers all possible instantiations of T .
Figure 5 shows the data-ﬂows obtained between a high-priority Task w and a
low-priority Task r for a scenario illustrating two cases of pre-emptions. Notice that
the high-to-low buﬀer Bh2l[w][r] achieves the data-ﬂows required to satisfy the
correctness property for both inputs of Task r.
3 Formalization using extended transition systems
In order to prove the correctness of the protocol, we must provide formal deﬁnitions
of: the semantics of c programs, the priority and preemption mechanisms, the
predicates that are used to express the property. Moreover, the protocol makes
several assumptions concerning the sequences of events emitted by the system under
control ; they must appear in our formalization.
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3.1 Event-based extended transitions systems
All the states along a run of the system are named by a symbol such as V,V1,....
Intuitively, they refer to memory states. To represent the behavior of the control
system as a transition system, we introduce three predicates that relate source and
target states to: transitions on the execution of a sequential program ; transitions
on execution of an interleaving of programs ; and transitions on a event. The
predicate 〈V,P ,V ′〉 holds if all terminating runs of the program P , starting in the
initial state V, results in a state V ′. Similarly, 〈V,P1|P2,V ′〉 holds if all interleaved
executions of programs P1,P2 make the system evolve from state V to V ′. Finally,
the predicate V e−→V ′ holds if e is the only event that occurs between the states V
and V ′. Therefore, the behavior of the control system wrt. a sequence of events
σ = e1 ; e2 ; . . . ; en can be represented as a conjunction of predicates that link events
and states V0 e1−→V1 ∧ V1 e2−→V2 ∧ . . . ∧ Vn−1 en−→Vn.
3.2 Semantics of assignments as a conjunction of symbolic equalities
The proof requires us to reason on sequences of assignments independently of the
actual values of the variables. Therefore, we extend the domain of values with
symbols made of a variable annotated with the number of times it has been updated.
Thus, x0 denotes the value of variable x at the beginning of the execution and xn
its value after n assignments of x. In this setting, the semantics of a sequence
of assignments is exactly captured by a conjunction of symbolic equalities. For
instance, the sequence of instructions t = x ; x = y ; y = t have the semantic
property t1 = x0 ∧ x1 = y0 ∧ y1 = t1 from which it is easy to prove that x1 = y0
∧ y1 = x0, meaning that the instructions correctly swap the values of x and y.
Formally, the value of a program variable x in a state V is represented by the
term eval(V,x). In our framework formulæ and expressions are represented as
uninterpreted terms, meaning that they are not functions but syntactical structures
which can be explored. Expressions can be simpliﬁed by the mean of Rule (simpl,
Fig. 1) using a recursive function (simpl) over the structure of terms that evaluates
the arithmetic part and preserves the symbolic part of an expression. For an atomic
expression e, simpl(e) is equal to e if e is a constant or a symbolic value xn or a
logical variable i; it is undeﬁned if e is a program variable. We now deﬁne the
eﬀect of simpl on term constructors of expressions.
simpl(eval(V, x)) = xk a symbolic value with k = ac(V, x) if x is a program variable
simpl(eval(V, i)) = i if i is a logical variable (i.e. not sensitive to state)
simpl(eval(V, c)) = c if c is a constant
simpl(eval(V, t[e1, . . . , en])) = eval(V, t[ simpl(eval(V,e1)) , . . . , simpl(eval(V,en)) ]) if t is an array
simpl(eval(V, op(e1, . . . , en))) = simpl(op(eval(V,e1), . . . , eval(V,en)))
simpl(op(e1, . . . , en)) =
(
cop (simpl(e1), . . . , simpl(en)) if simpl(ei) is a constant, for all i
op(simpl(e1), . . . , simpl(en)) otherwise
The symbol cop denotes the mathematical operator on values while op is a term
constructor. The term ac(V, x) plays a central role ; it denotes the assignment
counter of x at state V. It is updated at each assignment of x, see Rule (asg3, Fig. 9).
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4 The semantic rules of the proof-system
The proof system that must be validated by the evaluators consists in the logical
rules of Figure 1, the semantic rules of Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, additional rules to deal
with operators (+,−,<,≤) on natural numbers, the rule bool(b)¬¬b = b on booleans and one
typing rules per operator. The mathematical and typing rules are not provided.
They are very simple since the protocol set boolean and above all the management
of buﬀer doesn’t depend on the domain of the data stored in it.
For the sake of clarity, the derivation rules are written using simplifying no-
tations: all modiﬁcations of the set of hypotheses are due to the logical rules
(∨elim,⇒intro, ¬intro,∃elim) of Figure 1. Therefore, we omit the hypotheses and write Φ
instead of H  Φ in the semantic rules since none of these rules introduce or remove
hypotheses. The symbol (↑↓) means that the rule can be used in both directions
and summarizes two derivation rules. The side-condition of a rule is a constraint
that governs its application. It is evaluated by the proof-checker instead of being
part of the proof. A typing side condition typ(x) on a variable x corresponds
to checking that typ(x) belongs to the current hypotheses. The typing constraints
(evt(e), seq(σ),...) are omitted when the type of variable is clear from the context.
The intended meaning of the semantic rules is given in the ﬁgures and only
the most signiﬁcant will be commented here. Figure 7 deﬁnes well-formed traces
of events. Due to the side condition wf(σ), these rules can only be used with a
sequence σ which has been declared as a well-formed sequence in the hypotheses.
Successive runs of a task i form a sequence of events which can be deﬁned by
the regular expression ( i ; i ; i)∗. Then, a well-formed sequence is an interleaving
of such sequences (for all tasks from 0 to T ) that complies with the priorities of
tasks. This deﬁnition is captured by the rules of Figure 7 which follow the original
formulation of assumptions on the control systems given in [19].
Figure 8 formally deﬁnes properties of the operators (..), (;) and (⊆) on traces
of events. Rule (=seq , Fig. 8) which derives equality on sub-sequences of a well-formed
trace σ is valid since each event of σ is unique (events of a well-formed trace are
annotated with an occurrence number). Figure 9 gives an operational semantics to
the c constructions used in the protocol. The eﬀect of an instruction is deﬁned in
terms of properties of its source and target states. The semantics of simple for loops
(for1, for2, Fig. 9) is deﬁned in terms of a sequence of simpler instructions. This form of
equivalence-based semantics is easily validated by programmers. Our semantics of
assignments – in terms of assignment counters ac(V, v), see (asg3, Fig. 9) – is precise
enough to express that a program P has no eﬀect on a variable v: this holds if and
only if the assignment counter of v hasn’t been changed during the execution of
P . Rule (independency) elaborates on this remark: if P1 has no eﬀect on a variable v
then the eﬀect of the execution of P1|P2 on v is that of P2. No other property of
the interleaving of programs is needed in the correctness proof. Finally, the rules of
Figure 10 relate sequences of events, sequences of programs and transitions between
states on the basis of associations pcse(P , σ) between a procedure call P and its
sequence of events σ.
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wf(σ)
k
i ..
p
j ⊆ σ prio[i] > prio[j]
k
i ..
k
i ..
p
j ⊆ σ
priority1 wf(σ)
k
i ..
p
j ⊆ σ prio[i] > prio[j]
k
i ..
k
i ..
p
j ⊆ σ
priority2
wf(σ)
k
i ⊆ σ
k
i ..
k
i ⊆ σ
scheds wf(σ)
k
i ⊆ σ
k
i ..
k
i ⊆ σ
schedf wf(σ)
k
i ⊆ σ k > 1
k−1
i ..
k
i ⊆ σ
schedt
evt(e)
∃i,k e = ki ∨ e = ki ∨ e = ki
evt evt(e),wf(σ)
eki .. e
p
i ⊆ σ
k < p
inc wf(σ)
V σ−→V ′
∀v ac(V, v) = 0 init
The deﬁnition of well-formed traces of events captures the assumptions about the control system. A well-
formed trace respects the priorities. If the priority of Task i is greater than that of Task j and Task i
starts before Task j then it ﬁnishes its execution (event ki ): before Task j starts (priority1) and before
the end of Task j (priority2). Each starting event ki is preceded by a triggering event
k
i (scheds). Each
ﬁnishing event ki is preceded by the corresponding starting event
k
i (schedf ). A triggering event
k
i is taken
into account by the system (and appears in the trace) if and only if the current task ended its previous
execution (schedt). Rule (evt) says that events are elements of { ki , ki , ki | i, k ∈ }. The occurrence
number of each event increases along a well-formed trace (inc). Finally, a well-formed trace of events starts
with an initial state where the variables have not been assigned: their counters of assignment equal 0 and
their values are unknown.
Fig. 7. The deﬁnition of well-formed traces of events
σ′ ⊆ σ
∃σ1,σ2 σ1 ;σ′ ;σ2 = σ
def⊆(↑↓)
σ1 .. σ2 ⊆ σ
∃σ′ σ1 ;σ′ ;σ2 ⊆ σ
def..(↑↓) wf(σ)
e ;σ1 ; e′ ⊆ σ e ;σ2 ; e′ ⊆ σ
σ1 = σ2
=seq
σ1 ;σ2 ⊆ σ
σ1 .. σ2 ⊆ σ
weakening
σ1 .. σ2 ⊆ σ
σ1 ⊆ σ
subl
σ1 .. σ2 ⊆ σ
σ2 ⊆ σ subr
σ1 .. σ2 .. σ3 ⊆ σ
σ1 .. σ3 ⊆ σ subm
σ .. e1 ⊆ σ′ σ .. e2 ⊆ σ′
σ .. e1 .. e2 ⊆ σ ∨ σ .. e2 .. e1 ⊆ σ′
merge
σ1 .. e ⊆ σ e .. σ2 ⊆ σ
σ1 .. e .. σ2 ⊆ σ
join
Rule (def⊆) deﬁnes the sub-sequence predicate (⊆). Rule (def ..) captures the intended meaning of the
loose sequence notation σ1 .. σ2. Two sub-traces of a well-formed sequence σ which have corresponding
starting and ending events are equivalent (= seq) since all events are unique in a well-formed sequence.
Any sequence σ1;σ2 can be seen as a special case of a loose sequence σ1 .. σ2 = σ1 ;σ ;σ2 for an empty
σ (weakening). Rules (subl, subr, subm) are used to focus on sub-parts of a given loose sequence. On
the contrary loose sequences can be combined using Rules (merge, join). All of these rules are necessary
and suﬃcient to conduct the case study on possible completion with the events kw,
k
w,
p
r ,
p
r of the loose
sequence kw ..
p
r ..
k+1
w used in the correctness property.
Fig. 8. Operations and relations between sequences (;) sub-sequences (⊆) and loose sequences (..)
4.1 The sketch of the proof and its construction
The proof of the correctness property of Figure 6 is driven by an induction on k
of a property Φ that implies the correctness property. It is common in proofs of
programs that the expected property is not inductive and therefore requires the
proof of a stronger property Φ that is inductive and entails the desired one [4]. The
Φ property extends the conclusion of the correctness property in a conjunction of
the initial goal with additional propositions which state that 1) tasks other than
r and w do not aﬀect the arrays A[r]...[...] and A[w]...[...] for any array A used
in the protocol and 2) in the target state of a triggering event pr (resp. kw) the
assignment counter of inp[r][w] (resp. out[w]) is equal to p (resp. k). The
interesting part in the proof of Φ consists in a case study of all the possible ways
to complete the sub-sequence kw ..
p
r ..
k+1
w with the events
k
w,
k
w,
p
r ,
p
r . Then,
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〈V, v=e,V ′〉
eval(V ′,v) = eval(V,e)
asg1
〈V, v=e,V ′〉
∀x, ¬alias(V, v, x) ⇒ eval(V ′,x) = eval(V,x) ∧ ac(V ′, x) = ac(V, x)
asg2
〈V, v=e,V ′〉
ac(V ′, v) = ac(V, v) + 1
asg3 int(x),int(y)
x
syntax
= y
∀V ¬alias(V, x, y) no−alias1
data(t[...]),data(t′[...])
t
syntax
= t′ ∨ eval(V,e1) = eval(V,e′1) ∨ . . . ∨ eval(V,en) = eval(V,e′n)
∀V ¬alias(V, t[e1][...][en], t′[e′1]...[e′n])
no−alias2
〈V1,P1;P2,V2〉
∃V 〈V1,P1,V〉 ∧ 〈V,P2,V2〉
seq(↑↓)
〈V, P,V ′〉 eval(V,exp)
〈V, if(exp){P} else { },V ′〉 if1
〈V, P,V ′〉 ¬(eval(V,exp))
〈V, if(exp){ } else {P},V ′〉 if2
〈V, for(i=0;i<0;i=i+1){ },V ′〉
〈V, i=0 ,V ′〉 for1 (↑↓) safe(P,{i,n})
〈V, for(i=0;i<n;i=i+1){P (i)},V ′〉 ∧ 0 < n
〈V, for(i=0;i<n−1;i=i+1){P (i)} ;P (n),V ′〉 for2 (↑↓)
decl(proc(p1, . . . , pn){Body(p1,...,pn)})
〈V, Body(eval(V,v1), . . . , eval(V,vn)) ,V ′〉
〈V, proc(v1, . . . , vn) ,V ′〉
proc−call
Rule (asg1) states that after the c instruction v=e the value of v in the target state is that of e in the
source state. In the meantime, all variables which are not aliased to v are not aﬀected by the assignment
of v: neither their value nor their assignment counter (asg2). The guarantee of non-aliasing is obtained by
rules (no−alias1) and (no−alias2) which exploit the type of variables, the syntactic comparison of variable
name, and in some cases a simple reasoning on the indices of arrays. Each assignment of a variable v
increases its counter of assignment (asg3). The simple for loops of the protocol are tackled by standard
proofs of loop invariants that use the induction principle (ind , Fig. 1) and the Rules (for1, for2) which
deﬁne the meaning of a for loop in terms of simpler instructions. The condition safe(P, V ) of Rule (for2)
syntactically checks that the program P doesn’t write variables of V . Rules (if1, if2) are borrowed from
standard operational semantics of conditional instructions. Rule (proc−call) relates procedure calls to the
execution of their body. No other rule is needed to reason on the procedures os and task of the protocol.
Fig. 9. Semantic rules for the C instructions used in the protocol
∃V,V′ V σ−→V ′
seq−state1
V1 σ1 ;σ2−−−−→V2
∃V V1 σ1−−→V ∧ V σ2−−→V2
seq−state2 (↑↓)
∃σ V σ−→V ′
∃P 〈V,P ,V ′〉 seq−prg1 (↑↓) pcse(P1,σ1),pcse(P2,σ2)
V σ1|σ2−−−−→V ′
〈V,P1|P2,V ′〉
seq−prg2 (↑↓)
V σ−→V ′ size(σ, 0)
V = V ′ size0 evt(e) size(e, 1) size1
size(σ, n) size(σ′, n′)
size(σ|σ′, n + n′) size2
∀V1, 〈V,P1,V1〉 ⇒ ac(V, v) = ac(V1, v) 〈V,P2,V2〉
〈V,P1|P2,V ′〉 ⇒ eval(V ′,v) = eval(V2,v)
independency
Rules (seq−state1) and (seq−state2) link memory states and sequences of events by means of the predicate
V σ−→V ′. Then, Rules (seq−prg1) and (seq−prg2) associate sequences of events to executions of programs
and vice versa: Rule (seq−prg1) assumes the existence of a correspondence between executions of programs
and sequences of events. Rule (seq−prg2) exploits the sequences of events associated to programs by the
static predicate pcse in order to bind the interleaved execution of two programs to the interleaving of their
sequences of events. Two states that are joined by a sequence of size 0 are equal (size0). An event is
a sequence of size 1 (size1). No event is lost in the interleaving of two sequences (size2). The last rule
(independency) states a crucial property of the interleaved execution of two programs P1 and P2. If P1 has
no eﬀect on a variable v – i.e. its assignment counter ac(..., v) has not been modiﬁed from V to V1 – then,
the eﬀect of P1|P2 on v is that of P2. This rule is a reformulation of the Owicki-Gries’ rule for concurrent
programs.
Fig. 10. Relating memory states, sequences of events and sequences of instructions
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for each sub-sequence, the execution of the procedures associated to events are
examined to prove (inp[r][w])p = (out[w])k in every case. All of these proofs
rely on the same two lemmata which show that: 1) tasks other than r and w that
can be interleaved with r and w do not aﬀect the pair of buﬀers used by r and w ;
2) the eﬀect of os(r), os(w), task(r), task(w) realize the expected data-ﬂow.
Large parts of the proof were conducted automatically with the help of a sym-
bolic interpreter of c programs developed for this occasion. The interpreter inter-
acts with the user for conditional instructions and records the derivation steps in
a proof-term that is built during the guided execution. The resulting proof-term
contains proof-obligations which must be completed afterward. The inductions and
the proof of independency were done by hand with the help of lemmata.5
By using a prover such as pvs or b we would have beneﬁted from simpliﬁcations
and decision procedures for arithmetic but it is not possible to produce an indepen-
dent proof-term using these provers. Therefore, we would have had to include the
prover in the tcb. Actually we started with the coq proof-assistant which produces
proof-terms but the overhead, the complexity of formalization and the numerous
proof-obligations revealed that coq was not inappropriate for our purpose, even if
it provides tactics to reduce the proof activity. Moreover, the coq proof-checker is
not yet certiﬁed.
5 Conclusion
The evaluators need to be completely convinced before delivering a certiﬁcate of
correctness for an application. At the highest level of certiﬁcation, evaluators must
be suspicious (the proof must address the actual correctness property and the actual
program instead of an abstract model of the problem), conservative (they dislike
new theories and new tools that require a deep understanding to validate their
verdict) and rigorous (they will investigate the provided evidence until they reach
a deep understanding of the proof and will reject any opaque deduction). Finally,
they are skeptical (they only accept combinations of low level evidence), and, justly,
paranoiac (they trust almost no tools and ask for a minimal tcb). Generally speak-
ing, the less theoretical background is needed to understand a proof, the easier they
are to convince.
pcc, fpcc and veriﬁcation tools that produce an independent checkable witness
of their verdict give a great level of conﬁdence in a software. However, these tech-
niques fail to fulﬁll all of the evaluators’ requirements. To date, the greatest level of
conﬁdence has been reached by developments in lf or coq. These frameworks pro-
duce formal proofs using the smallest known set of general purpose derivation rules
and, consequently, they oﬀer small proof-checkers [1]. Even then, the evaluators
can reject such proofs if they are not familiar with the underlying theory of lf and
coq which are based on dependant types and the Curry-Howard isomorphism [18].
More likely, such proofs can be rejected due to the overly detailed formalization of
the semantic model that is required in these provers [9].
5 Lemmata cannot introduce potential ﬂaws as they are just systematic combinations of derivation rules.
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In this paper we present the notion of convincing proof designed to meet evalu-
ators’ requirements. It can be summarized as follows: the logic of the property and
the semantics of the system are explicit; they are given as derivation rules which
must be validated by the evaluators; the proof uses only these validated rules; the
proof-checker is also validated as it consists in a straightforward translation of the
derivation rules in a recursive function. Therefore the tcb is close to minimum: {a
compiler,6 a machine}. Our methodology reduces the evaluators’ task to the vali-
dation of the derivation rules and only relies on the theoretical background of any
competent bachelor in computer science.
We illustrate our framework on the correctness proof of a data exchange protocol
used to implement multi-tasking real-time data-ﬂow applications on an event-based
operating system featuring priority and preemption [19]. The proof of the protocol
takes into account all of the system characteristics and provides evidence at a rea-
sonable level of detail, avoiding the full description of an operational semantics of
concurrency (to render the management of tasks by the os).
Our goal is now to produce convincing proofs by instrumentation of existing
automatic veriﬁcation tools. This is achievable once the set of derivation rules that
correspond to the veriﬁcation steps has been identiﬁed. We also seek for a way to
beneﬁt from the power of the coq proof-assistant [6] and its numerous libraries of
mathematical theories while maintaining the global proof at a convincing level of
reasoning – unnecessary details must be kept out of the proof. Our plan is to isolate
purely mathematical theorems and to reserve coq for their demonstration.
References
[1] Appel, A., N. Michael, A. Stump and R. Virga, A trustworthy proof checker, Journal of Automated
Reasoning 31 (2003), pp. 231–260.
[2] Arons, T., A. Pnueli, S. Ruah, J. Xu and L. Zuck, Parameterized veriﬁcation with automatically
computed inductive assertions, in: Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, LNCS 2102 (2001), pp. 221–234,
(CAV’01).
[3] Barras, B., Veriﬁcation of the interface of a small proof system in coq, in: Types for Proofs and
Programs, LNCS 1512 (1996), pp. 28–45, (TYPES’96).
[4] Bensalem, S., Y. Lakhnech and S. Owre, InVeSt: A tool for the veriﬁcation of invariants, in: Computer
Aided Veriﬁcation, LNCS 1427 (1998), pp. 505–510, (CAV’98).
[5] Benveniste, A., P. Caspi, S. Edwards, n. Halbwachs, P. Le Guernic and R. de Simone, The synchronous
languages 12 years later, IEEE Computer Society 91 (2003), pp. 64–83.
[6] Bertot, Y. and P. Caste´ran, “Interactive Theorem Proving and Program Development (Coq’Art: The
Calculus of Inductive Constructions),” Texts in Theoretical Computer Science, Springer, 2004.
[7] Filliaˆtre, J.-C., Veriﬁcation of non-functional programs using interpretations in type theory, Journal of
Functional Programming 13 (2003), pp. 709–745.
[8] Filliaˆtre, J.-C. and C. Marche´, The Why/Krakatoa/Caduceus platform for deductive program
veriﬁcation, in: Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, LNCS 4590 (2007), pp. 173–177, (CAV’07).
[9] Hamid, N. and Z. Shao, Interfacing Hoare logic and type systems for foundational proof-carrying code,
in: Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics, LNCS 3223 (2004), pp. 118–135, (TPHOL’04).
6 Attempts to remove compilers from the tcb are not convincing, unless we can certify one compiler. The
research on this topic has recently obtained encouraging results [12].
M. Garnacho, M. Périn / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 238 (2009) 41–56 55
[10] Hennell, M., J. Woodcock and M. Woodward, The safety integrity levels of IEC 61508 and a revised
proposal, in: Embedded Systems Show (2006), (ESS’06).
[11] Henzinger, T., R. Jhala, R. Majumdar, G. Necula, G. Sutre and W. Weimer, Temporal-safety proofs
for systems code, in: Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, LNCS 2404 (2002), pp. 526–538, (CAV’02).
[12] Leroy, X., Formal certiﬁcation of a compiler back-end, or: programming a compiler with a proof
assistant, in: ACM Conference on Principles of Programming Languages (2006), pp. 42–54, (POPL’06).
[13] Namjoshi, K. S., Certifying model checkers, in: Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, LNCS 2102 (2001), pp.
2–13, (CAV’01).
[14] Necula, G. C., Proof-carrying code, in: ACM Conference on Principles of Programming Languages
(1997), pp. 106–119, (POPL’97).
[15] Peled, D. and L. Zuck, From model checking to a temporal proof, in: SPIN Workshop on Model Checking
Software, LNCS 2057 (2001), pp. 1–14, (SPIN’01).
[16] Randimbivololona, F., J. Souyris, P. Baudin, A. Pacalet, J. Raguideau and D. Schoen, Applying formal
proof techniques to avionics software: A pragmatic approach, in: Formal Methods in the Development
of Computing Systems, LNCS 1709 (1999), pp. 1798–1815, (FM’99).
[17] Tan, T. and R. Cleaveland, Evidence-based model checking, in: Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, LNCS
2404 (2002), pp. 455–470, (CAV’02).
[18] Thompson, S., “Type theory and functional programming,” Addison-Wesley, 1991.
[19] Tripakis, S., C. Sofronis, N. Scaife and P. Caspi, Semantics-preserving and memory-eﬃcient
implementation of inter-task communication under static-priority or EDF schedulers, in: ACM
Conference on Embedded Software (2005), pp. 353–360, (EMSOFT’05).
[20] van Dalen, D., “Logic and Structure,” Springer-Verlag, 1997.
[21] Wilding, M., D. A. Greve and D. Hardin, Eﬃcient simulation of formal processor models, Formal
Methods in System Design 18 (2001), pp. 233–248.
[22] Wu, D., A. W. Appel and A. Stump, Foundational proof checkers with small witnesses, in: ACM
Conference on Principles and Practice of Declarative Programming (2003), pp. 264–274, (PPDP’03).
M. Garnacho, M. Périn / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 238 (2009) 41–5656
